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Serving the Public Interest: 
Preventing Double-Breasting in the Construction Industry 
Testimony Respectfully Submitted to the Standing Committee on Law Amendments 
New Brunswick, Canada 
October 17, 2007 
Jeff Grabelsky 
Director, Construction Industry Program 
Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Introduction and Overview: 
Thank you for the opportunity to offer public testimony concerning legislative remedies 
for the problem of double-breasting in the construction industry. My remarks reflect a 
U.S. perspective on the issues before the Standing Committee. 
My name is Jeff Grabelsky. I am the Director of Cornell University's Construction 
Industry Program and have served in that capacity for seventeen years. Our program 
provides training and education services, and research and technical assistance to 
practitioners in the construction industry. Over 300,000 individuals across North 
America have participated in our programs. 
I have been a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) for 
thirty years and served as the national organizing director of the Building and 
Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. After September 11,2001,1 
represented the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York on the 
World Trade Center Emergency Project Labor-Management Partnership addressing 
health and safety issues at Ground Zero. After Hurricane Katrina, I helped plan the Gulf 
Coast Workforce Development Project to assist with regional reconstruction. 
I received my BA in political science from the University of Michigan, my MA in labor 
history from the Maxwell School of Citizenship at Syracuse University, my MS in 
industrial and labor relations from Cornell University, and my journeyman classification 
from the IBEW. 
In the interests of full disclosure, let me make clear at the outset that I am not a neutral 
observer. Rather, I am both a beneficiary and advocate of collective bargaining in the 
construction industry. My remarks are informed by own personal experience as well as 
my professional work. I believe that collective bargaining is a public good and that 
double-breasting is a public problem precisely because it undermines collective 
bargaining. 
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In the United States, we sometimes think that anyone who comes from over fifty miles 
away, wears a tie, and carries a briefcase is an expert. I know you set higher standards 
here in Canada. So let me begin with a disclaimer: I am not a legal expert on double-
breasting and will not comment on the substantive details of Bill 60 or any other 
legislative remedy you may consider in confronting the problem of double-breasting in 
the construction industry. Rather, my remarks will be contextual in nature and will 
address three key questions: 
First, why is it in the public interest to support and sustain a stable system of collective 
bargaining in the construction industry? 
Second, how does the practice of double-breasting undermine the stability of collective 
bargaining in the construction industry? 
Third, how has the problem of double-breasting been addressed, rather inadequately, in 
the United States? 
Why is it in the public interest to support and sustain a stable system of collective 
bargaining in the construction industry? 
In every industrial democracy, collective bargaining serves a vital public interest in the 
economy and society. 
When the right to organize and bargain collectively was established for private sector 
workers in the United States in 1935, our economy was in the grip of a severe depression. 
At that time, our elected leaders recognized that (quoting from the enabling legislation) 
"The inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers . . . tends to 
aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wages rates and the purchasing 
power of wage earners." In order to promote economic growth and to protect the public 
interest, the framers of our modern system of labor relations wrote, rather 
unambiguously: "It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States . . . to 
encourage[e] the practice . , . of collective bargaining." (NLRA, 1935) 
The wisdom of these political leaders was revealed in the decades that followed World 
War II. In the 1950's and 1960's, when over 25% of the workforce was unionized, living 
standards rose more dramatically than during any other period in U.S. history. Union 
members enjoyed the direct benefits of collective bargaining and non-union workers were 
uplifted by the union wage effect. During those years, American workers had sufficient 
bargaining power to win a fair share of an increasingly productive economy. Between 
1947 and 1973, productivity doubled and so did the real value of average wages. But 
from 1973 to the present, while productivity has increased by 67%, average wages have 
risen by only 15%. Why? Since the early 1970s, union density and membership have 
steadily declined in the United States. Today, only 12.5% of the total workforce and 
only 7.9% of the private sector workforce are unionized. As a consequence, U.S. 
workers have lost bargaining power and wages have stagnated. 
Legislative Testimony on Double-Breasting - New Brunswick BCTC - Grabelsky Testimony - 16/! 7/07 2 
So, the intended outcome of our National Labor Relations Act - to raise living standards 
and stimulate the economy by promoting the practice of collective bargaining - was 
achieved only when a stable system of collective bargaining was supported and sustained. 
Once our national commitment to collective bargaining weakened and unionization 
declined, those intended outcomes became more elusive. 
While collective bargaining clearly serves a public interest in the larger society and 
economy, it plays an even more critical role in the construction industry. Construction is 
one of the most important and least understood sectors of our economy. In the United 
States, construction is a one trillion dollar industry, a solid barometer of general 
economic performance, and the only goods-producing sector that continues to post job 
growth. In construction, collective bargaining provides a stabilizing infrastructure for an 
industry that has fiercely competitive, even chaotic dynamics. In three essential ways, 
collective bargaining plays a vital function in the construction industry: one, inducing 
contractors to compete constructively on a level playing field; two, maintaining and 
dispatching a pool of skilled workers to employers that have a variable demand for such 
labor; and, three, training and replenishing the human capital upon which the industry 
depends. Let me briefly elaborate on each one of these important functions. 
First, collective bargaining induces contractors to compete constructively on a level 
playing field. As you know, construction is a contract industry in which employers 
competitively bid on projects. In a highly unionized market, where contractors are bound 
by the same terms and conditions of an area standard agreement, each competitor plays 
by the same rules and pays essentially the same costs for labor, equipment and materials. 
How, then, does one contractor out-compete another? Those employers who engage in 
progressive human resource management induce their employees to be more productive. 
Those employers who maintain and provide their employees with state-of-the-art 
equipment achieve greater competitiveness. Those employers who deliver the right 
materials to the job at the right time suffer fewer construction delays. Those employers 
who exhibit uncanny business acumen seize opportunities than average contractors may 
miss. 
In short, in densely unionized markets, contractors compete in ways that encourage the 
cream to rise to the top and ensure that the best-value buildings are constructed in those 
markets. Construction users and customers, including governmental entities and the 
general public, are thus the principal beneficiaries of a stable system of collective 
bargaining. Coming from a strong union city like New York, I can say we have enjoyed 
the fruits of this kind of constructive competition that has built one of the most complex 
and magnificent skylines in the world. 
But when unions are driven to the margins and are unable to impose this kind of level 
playing field on a construction market, what kind of competition emerges? 
Unfortunately, without the regulatory infrastructure of collective bargaining, in a 
nonunion market one contractor out-competes another by cutting corners, ignoring 
regulations, violating codes, abandoning specifications. The business practices that have 
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become increasingly common in the growing underground economy - misclassifying 
employees as independent contractors, cheating on wage and hour laws, disregarding 
health and safety standards - are infecting de-unionized markets and are punishing all 
legitimate contractors in those markets, union and non-union, alike. Sadly, without the 
benefits of a stable collective bargaining system, it is not the cream that rises to the top, it 
is the . . . well, use your imagination. In that event, construction users and customers, 
including the general public, are the principal victims. 
Second, collective bargaining plays a critical role in maintaining and dispatching a pool 
of skilled workers to contractors in the industry. Given the ebbs and flows of the 
industry, employers have a variable demand for skilled labor. Few contractors have the 
resources to maintain an internal workforce of sufficient size to meet their labor needs 
during peak demand. Building trades unions have historically recruited and dispatched 
skilled craftsmen to contractors when they needed such workers and have thus removed 
the worry and burden of employers who would not bid on projects without the confidence 
that they could secure employees if they won the work. In de-unionized construction 
markets, nonunion contractors often find themselves scrambling to meet their labor 
needs. 
Third, union-based apprenticeship programs, funded through collective bargaining, play a 
critical role in replenishing the human capital pool of the industry. Construction has a 
seemingly inescapable reliance on skilled crafts. Individual contractors generally lack the 
resources and will to invest in training. Moreover, given the transient nature of 
employment, it is not unreasonable for individual employers to refrain from training 
current employees who may go to work for competing contractors in the future. A stable 
system of collective bargaining compels all signatory contractors to invest in industry-
wide training. In the U.S., where less than 20% of the industry is unionized, union-based 
apprenticeship programs still account for about 90% of the training. 
Unfortunately, a shrinking portion of the U.S. construction industry enjoys these benefits 
offered by a stable system of collective bargaining. Since 1973, construction union 
membership in the U.S. has declined from 1.6 to 1 million, while construction 
employment has increased from 4.1 to 8.4 million. During that period, construction 
union density declined from 39.5% to below 14%. As a consequence, standards in the 
industry have eroded. For example, average construction wages have declined by about 
25% in last two decades. It has become more difficult to attract and retain skilled 
workers in the industry and labor shortages have become increasingly common and 
especially severe in regions of our country where the system of collective bargaining is 
weakest. And, the unscrupulous business practices that were once primarily the province 
of our underground economy have contaminated construction markets where building 
trades unions have been marginalized. 
There are a number of factors that have contributed to the long-term trend of declining 
unionization in the U.S. construction industry. I would like to discuss one contributing 
factor: the proliferation of double-breasting. That leads to second question I will 
address. 
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How does the practice of double-breasting undermine the stability of collective 
bargaining in the construction industry? 
Ten years ago, at the Industrial Relations Research Association's annual conference, 
Jerome Barret, a former official of our Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
reflected on the range of factors that had contributed to the decline of union membership 
and collective bargaining. Few construction industry experts were surprised when he 
included double-breasting on his list. He was, of course, referring to the increasingly 
common practice of employers operating one company pursuant to a collective 
bargaining agreement and another company as a non-union entity. This practice enables 
contractors to build union where it is advantageous or necessary to do so, while at the 
same time to operate nonunion where it is advantageous and possible to do so. 
The statutory framework for collective bargaining in the U.S. is silent on the issue of 
double-breasting. The case law on the issue has a long and tangled history. The seminal 
Kiewit case was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. 
("Kiewit") and South Prairie Construction Co. ("South Prairie") were wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Peter Kiewit Sons' Inc. Kiewit operated as a union firm, signatory to a 
collective bargaining agreement with the International Union of Operating Engineers. 
South Prairie operated nonunion in the same Midwestern markets as Kiewit. The union 
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, arguing 
that South Prairie was obligated to recognize and honor the Kiewit collective bargaining 
agreement. The Board rejected that claim, the Court of Appeals overturned the Board 
and found that Kiewit and South Prairie were a "single employer" and the Supreme Court 
ruled that the lower court had exceeded its authority and remanded the case back to the 
Board, which dismissed the union's complaint and allowed South Prairie to continue to 
operate nonunion. In the process, four factors were established to determine if two 
double-breasted firms were legally a single employer: interrelation of operations, 
common management, common ownership, and, most importantly, centralized control of 
labor relations. 
There were many subsequent cases that followed Kiewit and examined whether double-
breasted firms were single employers, single bargaining units or alter egos. These 
involved different legal factors, standards and degrees of difficulty in establishing 
whether or not a double-breasted firm represented an unlawful ploy on the part of a 
unionized contractor to escape the obligations of a collective bargaining agreement and 
evade its responsibilities under our National Labor Relations Act. (One of the points I 
will make momentarily is that the lack of clarity in the legislation seems to have fueled an 
endless stream of Board disputes and court cases.) 
My key point here is that the Kiewit decision in 1977 opened the flood gates and led 
growing numbers of major contractors to double-breast. In 1983, just five years after 
Kiewit was decided, 44% of the 50 largest contractors in the U.S. were double-breasted 
(Steven Allen). 
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But the immediate question I am addressing is how the practice of double-breasting 
undermines the stability of collective bargaining in the construction industry. The simple 
answer is that it is not exceedingly difficult for a unionized contractor to operate a 
double-breasted nonunion firm and, given the increasingly intense competitive pressures 
to cut labor costs (given rising land and material costs), employers have a strong 
incentive to double-breast. To the extent unionized contractors have pursued that 
business strategy, how has it impacted the system of collective bargaining in the 
construction industry? 
In 1995, Steven G. Allen, a labor economist at North Carolina State University, 
conducted an econometric study to examine three potential causes of the decline of 
collective bargaining in the construction industry: increased union costs relative to the 
open shop, reduced coverage by prevailing wage laws, and expanded double-breasting 
following the 1977 Kiewit decision. Without me explaining how he conducted his 
research and controlled for other factors, let me say that his findings indicated that the 
most plausible explanation for the decline of collective bargaining in the 1980s was 
double-breasting. Controlling for the other factors, Allen predicted that union density 
should have risen by 2.4% after 1977 as the relative costs of union construction fell. 
However, because of Kiewit and the proliferation of double-breasting, collective 
bargaining coverage actually declined by 14%. 
Collective bargaining is a public good that is undermined by the practice of double-
breasting. As I have already indicated, destabilizing the system of collective bargaining 
has had profound consequences for construction users, workers, unions, customers and 
the general public. This leads to the third question I wish to address. 
How has the problem of double-breasting been addressed, rather inadequately, in the 
United States? 
As a growing number of unionized contractors pursued the double-breasting option in the 
post-Kiewit years, there was rising concern among those industry practitioners who were 
committed to collective bargaining. While some states may have been inclined to address 
the double-breasting problem, they were pre-empted from doing so under federal law. 
By 1986, 80% of the top 25 contractors in the U.S. were double-breasted (Stuart 
Schulman). The next year, legislation was introduced in the United States Congress to 
substantially change the law and proscribe the practice of double-breasting. 
The House version of the proposed legislation was "A bill to amend the National Labor 
Relations Act to increase the stability of collective bargaining in the building and 
construction industry." Its most important provision would have added the following 
language to the NLRA: "In the construction industry, any two or more business entities 
performing or otherwise conducting or supervising the same or similar work, in the same 
or in different geographical areas, and having directly or indirectly (a) substantial 
common ownership; (b) common management; or (c) common control; shall be deemed a 
single employer." The law would have extended collective bargaining coverage to the 
non- union side of a double-breasted unionized employer. 
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Unfortunately, although HR 281 passed the House of Representatives, its companion S 
492 failed in the Senate. Since that time there has been no successful effort to resolve the 
problem of double-breasting with federal legislation. 
The failure to find an effective legislative remedy has meant a continuing lack of clarity 
about the issue of double-breasting. The unfortunate consequence has been growing 
instability in bargaining relationships and costly conflicts at the National Labor Relations 
Board and the courts. Unions have been left to their own devices when they suspect that 
a signatory contractor has established a non-union firm to unlawfully evade their 
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement. In those cases, the union can either 
file an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the employer is unlawfully refusing to 
bargain (8a5), strike if the employer continues to refuse to bargain, or sue and/or seek 
arbitration (301) claiming that the employer is violating the collective bargaining 
agreement by employing non-union workers, contrary to the union security clause. 
Each of these alternatives carries costs and risks, not the least of which is poisoning what 
could have been a constructive bargaining relationship. For example, one case involved 
twelve costly years of litigation that began when Nor-Cal Plumbing Inc., a unionized 
contractor, pursued the double-breasting option and opened up a non-union firm. The 
union trust funds sued the company, claiming that the non-union operation was actually 
an alter ego set up by Nor-Cal to evade its obligations under the collective bargaining 
agreement. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against the 
company and affirmed a $ 1.8 million verdict to the union funds. Had there been the kind 
of legislation you are contemplating - legislation that would remove confusion and doubt 
about the legality of double-breasting - this costly case would never have been initiated. 
Just this year, the Road Sprinkler Fitters Union Local 669 engaged in a nationwide strike 
against contractors represented by the National Fire Sprinkler Association that idled 
11,000 workers. One of the key issues in the strike was double-breasting. Bradley M. 
Karbowsky, business manager of Local 669, asserted that the union needed to protect its 
market share from "the devastating effects" of double-breasting and that greater 
restrictions were needed to prohibit contractors from engaging in the practice. Had there 
been the kind of legislative proscriptions against double-breasting that you could enact, 
this costly strike might not have taken place. 
Conclusion: 
Collective bargaining has been and continues to be a public good that gives workers a 
voice at work and contributes to economic vitality and rising living standards. In the 
construction industry, collective bargaining provides a stabilizing infrastructure that 
induces contractors to compete on a level playing without resorting to cutting corners or 
wages or engaging in a range of unscrupulous business practices that are infecting too 
many markets today. A stable system of collective bargaining helps maintain a pool of 
skilled workers from which contractors can draw to meet their variable demand for labor. 
Through collectively bargained training funds, the industry can replenish its human 
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capital and avoid the kinds of skilled labor shortages that are endemic to de-unionized 
construction markets. 
Double-breasting is a practice that enables unionized employers to escape the obligations 
of their collective bargaining agreements and to operate nonunion wherever possible. 
Double-breasting undermines collective bargaining and represents a significant public 
problem that could be effectively resolved with thoughtful legislation. I hope you will 
seize this opportunity to enact a good legislative remedy for a serious public problem that 
can and should be fixed. 
Thank you. 
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